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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

TONIL. BIGGS,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20051075-C A

:

Defendant/Appellant Toni Biggs has challenged on appeal a trial court ruling on a
motion to suppress. (Brief of Appellant, dated March 27, 2006). The trial court ruled
that Officer Wade Sanders had reasonable articulable suspicion to initiate a level-two
traffic stop when he learned from a computer database that a car driven by Tiana Tate
lacked insurance coverage. (See R. 96-99). Also, the court ruled that the defendants
motion to suppress should be denied. (R. 99).
Biggs maintains that the trial court ruling was incorrect in two respects. First, the
information from the computer database was insufficient to give rise to reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity. (Brief of Appellant, Argument B.L). Specifically, under
Utah law, a person driving a car may have insurance coverage as operator or owner of the
car. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-12a-301(2)(a) (2005), 31A-22-303(l)(a)(ii)(B) (2005).
Also, under the law a person may establish proof of insurance in a variety of ways. Utah
Code Ann. § 41-12a-303.2(2)(b), (4)(a) (2005). Here, Officer Sanders only had computer
database information about car insurance. He had no information about the driver, Tate,
or operator's insurance. (See e.g. R. 159:4-14).

Nevertheless, Sanders initiated a traffic stop. He based the stop on deficient
infomiation. (See Brief of Appellant, Argument B.l.(b)); see State v. Johnson. 805 P.2d
761, 764 (Utah 1991) (recognizing that a hunch is insufficient). That was unlawful.
The state disagrees. It seems to claim that the officer was originally justified in
detaining the vehicle due to the information from the computer database. (Brief of
Appellee, dated June 30, 2006, Argument LB.) In support of its claim, the state relies on
State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 63 P.3d 650. (See Brief of Appellee at 12-14). Yet, that
case is not controlling authority for the initial detention at issue here. (See infra,
Argument B. 1., herein).
In addition, the state maintains that in this case, the officer observed a criminal
violation under the Motor Vehicle Act, and that is sufficient to support the level-two
detention. (Brief of Appellee at 16-17). The state relies on Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a302(1) (2005). (IdL) Yet, the relevant provisions here are Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-12a301(2)(a) and 31A-22-303(l)(a)(i), (ii)(B). Those provisions permit a driver to carry
operator's insurance coverage. Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-12a-301(2)(a); 31A-22303(l)(a)(i), (ii)(B). Also, an offense occurs specifically if an officer requests proof of
insurance during a traffic stop and the driver cannot provide it. Utah Code Ann. §41-12a303.2(2)(a)(i), (5). Those provisions are separate from the state's reliance on § 41-12a302(1), which is not at issue here.
To the extent Officer Sanders relied on § 41-12a-302(l) as a basis for the stop, he
was relying on incorrect assumptions about the facts and the law. An assumption or
hunch is not enough to support reasonable suspicion to initiate a level-two detention.
2

Thus, this Court may reverse the trial court ruling on the motion to suppress.
Biggs' second argument on appeal concerns the scope of the level-two detention.
She maintains that the officer exceeded the original basis for the stop with the subsequent canine dmg sniff. The continued detention was unlawful. It was not strictly tied to
the officer's reason for the stop, and it was not supported by evidence of additional reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity, (Brief of Appellant, Argument B.2.).
The state does not dispute Biggs' argument on the merits, but instead claims that
the argument was not preserved. (See Brief of Appellee at 18). Yet, Biggs did all that
was required under the law for the issue. (See infra Argument, B.2., herein). She
presented a motion and memorandum concerning the excessive detention, and she relied
on the officer's testimony to support her argument that the continued detention was
unlawful. (See R. 42-69). Once Biggs raised the issue in the motion and memorandum,
the burden shifted to the state to demonstrate that the officer's actions were permissible
under the Fourth Amendment. Since the state failed in its burden of proof in this case,
the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress should be reversed.
ARGUMENT
THE STATE CLAIMS A COMPUTER CHECK REVEALING NO CAR
INSURANCE IS SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY A LEVEL-TWO STOP,
WHILE THE LAW ALLOWS A PERSON TO OPERATE A CAR WITH
AN ALTERNATIVE FORM OF INSURANCE COVERAGE. SINCE THE
LAW ALLOWS FOR THE ALTERNATIVE COVERAGE, THE COMPUTER CHECK IS INADEQUATE FOR REASONABLE SUSPICION. IN
ADDITION, THE OFFICER HERE EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF THE
STOP WHEN HE DETAINED BIGGS AND TATE FOR A CANINE DRUG
SNIFF. THE DEFENSE PROPERLY PRESERVED THE ISSUE BELOW.
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A. THE STATE DOES NOT DISPUTE THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S
FINDINGS SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED AS CONCLUSIONS.
The state does not dispute that the trial court's findings of fact on the motion to
suppress were "more like conclusions of law." (Brief of Appellee at 8). Indeed, the state
makes no effort to defend the trial findings as adequate. Nevertheless, the state asks this
Court to "assume that [the trial court found facts] in accord with its decision" to affirm
the trial court's ruling in this case. (Id. at 9 (cites omitted)). This Court is not required to
make such an assumption, particularly where the law requires the trial court specifically
to make the necessary findings for a ruling on a motion to suppress. !See Utah R. Crim. P.
12(e) (2006).
Recently, in American Fork City v. Singleton, 2002 UT App 331,57 P.3d 1124,
this Court ruled that where the trial court failed to make adequate findings of fact, remand
to the trial court was necessary. Id. This Court requires adequate trial court findings "to
conduct a meaningful review [on appeal] of the facts and of the law as applied to those
facts." Id. at %9. In Singleton, this Court vacated the judgment against defendant and
ordered further proceedings. Id. at f 11; see also State v. Real Property at 633 East 640
North, Orem, 942 P.2d 925, 931 (Utah 1997) (remanding for findings and conclusions on
a constitutional issue that was raised below, but not addressed by the trial court); State v.
Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1246 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (recognizing that defendant's "initial
appeal to this court was remanded to the trial court for findings of fact and conclusions of
law as to the bases for the denial of the motion to suppress"); State v. Genovesi, 871 P.2d
547, 550 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (stating that "[s]ince the issues presented in search and
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seizure cases are highly fact sensitive, the findings of fact must be sufficiently detailed to
allow this court to meaningfully review the trial court's decision" (internal cites omitted)).
Contrary to the state's assertions in this case (Brief of Appellee at 8-9), where the
trial court has made inadequate findings for a suppression issue, this Court is not required
to assume facts to support the trial court's decision.
B. BASED ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES HERE, THE DETENTION WAS
UNREASONABLE AND UNLAWFUL.
1. The State Maintains that Under Utah Law, if an Officer's Computer Check
Reveals Lack of Insurance on a Car, that Supports a Level-Two Detention. Yet,
Utah Law Allows for Alternative Coverage; Thus, a Computer Check Alone Is
Insufficient to Support Reasonable Suspicion of Criminal Activity.
The state maintains that an officer is justified in initiating a traffic stop if a
computer check reveals "that a vehicle is uninsured." (Brief of Appellee at 12). In
support of that claim, the state relies on State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 63 P.3d 650.
(Brief of Appellee at 12). According to the state, the court in Hansen concluded that an
officer is justified in making a level-two traffic stop based on a lack of insurance. (See
id.) Yet, the court in Hansen did not decide that issue.
In Hansen, the supreme court considered the following: whether the officer
exceeded the scope of a level-two detention with subsequent questioning and a search;
whether Hansen provided voluntary consent for a subsequent search; and whether the
evidence seized during the subsequent search was tainted by the excessive detention. See
Hansen, 2002 UT 125, lfl[2-3. Since Hansen did not challenge or dispute the validity of
the initial detention, the supreme court did not have occasion to analyze the issue. It
simply stated that the initial stop there was reasonable. IcL at ^[30; see also State v.
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Hansen, 2000 UT App 353,ffi[7and 12-13, 17 P.3d 1135 (considering whether the
continued detention exceeded the scope of the justification for the stop, and whether
Hansen provided voluntary consent for a search).
In addition, the defendant in Hansen was stopped by the officer for lack of
insurance on the car and an improper lane change. See Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ^[30. That
is distinguishable from this matter where Tate and Biggs were stopped solely because the
computer database reflected lack of insurance on the car. (See R. 159:4; see also 159:9).
Since Hansen is distinguishable and does not contain legal analysis as to whether lack of
insurance may support a level-two detention, it is not controlling authority for the issue
here. (See Brief of Appellant at 33-34).
Controlling authority includes judicial decisions that specifically address and
analyze a particular question of law or cause before the court. See Black's Law
Dictionary 143 (8th ed. 2004). The Utah Supreme Court has discussed what constitutes
controlling authority in Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989).
There, plaintiff challenged a statute of repose as unconstitutional under the open courts
clause of the Utah Constitution. On appeal, defendant claimed the statute had been
upheld in an earlier case. The Utah Supreme Court found that argument unpersuasive
since the earlier case could not be construed to have analyzed the issue. The court stated
the following:
[Defendant Buehner Concrete] asserts that this case is controlled by Good v.
Christensen, 527 P.2d 223 (Utah 1974). In Good, the Court merely stated that the
plaintiffs attacked the constitutionality of the statute. It did not specify which
constitutional provisions were relied on. With no analysis, the opinion simply
stated that "the claim is without merit." Id. at 225. The Court cited no authority
6

and gave no reasons. Under these circumstances, the opinion can only be read to
have disposed of a frivolous constitutional claim or what may have been a
potentially meritorious constitutional claim that was presented in a frivolous
manner. In Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., Ill P.2d at 683, we stated, "Whether
the Court [in Good] in fact addressed the merits of Article I section 11 is
speculative, and the ruling, therefore, has little persuasive effect [upon the issue of
the constitutionality of a statute of repose under Article I, section 11]."
Accordingly, Good is not dispositive here.
Horton, 785 P.2d at 1090; see State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, \6 n.2, 31 P.3d 528 (asserting
the state relied on cases that were not dispositive). The doctrine in Horton applies here.
In Hansen, the court had no reason to analyze whether a computer check for lack of insurance would be sufficient alone to support a level-two detention. See Hansen, 2002 UT
125. In that regard, Hansen does not dispose of the issue concerning the initial reason for
the stop and it does not constitute controlling authority on the matter.
Next, the state claims the initial level-two detention in this case was justified because "[permitting a vehicle to be operated on a Utah highway without owner's security
in effect is a crime: a class B misdemeanor." (Brief of Appellee at 14). According to the
state, the fact that Utah law allows for alternative, lawful insurance coverage for the
operator of a car is a "red herring." (Brief of Appellee at 16).
The state's analysis disregards the law. (See Brief of Appellant at 30-33). The law
allows for operator's insurance. .See Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-12a-301(2)(a) (stating that
resident car owners shall maintain "owner's or operator's security"); 31A-22-303(l)(a)(i),
(ii)(B) (describing an operator's policy). As the state asserts, "a driver covered by
operator's insurance commits no crime when driving an uninsured vehicle". (Brief of
Appellee at 17).
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Here, Officer Sanders had deficient information when he conducted the stop. (See
R. 159:4-14). He seemed to believe - and the state seems to claim - that where the Uninsured Motorist Identification Database Program reflects lack of insurance for a car, that
supports a per se violation. (See e.g. Brief of Appellee at 16). Yet, that is not the case.
(See R. 158:13-14, 15-16 (acknowledging that a person may have operator's or owner's
insurance, and there are database programs for each)); Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-12a301(2)(a) (allowing for owner's "or operator's security"); 31A-22-303(l)(a)(i), (ii)(B)
(allowing for operator's security). Indeed, according to the code, if the computer database
reflects coverage for the owner or operator, that is proof of insurance. See Utah Code
Ann. § 41-12a-303.2(2)(c) (2005). Notably, the code does not support the reverse proposition. See id. It does not state that if the computer database reflects lack of insurance,
that is proof of a violation. See id; see also id. at (2)(b) (stating that evidence of coverage may be established in various ways); Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-22-315(l)(a) (2005)
(stating that insurance information shall be updated once a month for coverage "as of the
previous month"), 41-12a-803(5) (2005); (R. 158:12, 16 (updates are once a month)).
In other contexts, courts have upheld a level-two traffic stop where the officer ran
a pre-detention computer check and learned about a licensing or registration violation,
and then s/he obtained a description of the owner from a radio/computer database to
compare against the person driving the car. See e,g. State v. Epling, 664 N.E.2d 1299
(Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (stating that during a radio check the officer learned of a suspended
license and he obtained a description of the owner matching the description of the driver);
State v. Owens, 599 N.E.2d 859 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (same); Hove v. Commonwealth,

442 S.E.2d 404, 405-06 (Va. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that the officer discovered a
violation during a pre-detention computer check and she obtained a pre-detention
description of the car owner matching the description of the driver). Those circumstances
supported reasonable suspicion to initiate a level-two stop against the driver/owner. See
e.g. Epling, 664 N.E.2d at 1300; Owens, 599 N.E.2d at 860; Hoye, 442 S.E.2d at 406.
Without similar information here, Officer Sanders was operating only on a hunch
about the law and the facts. Officer Sanders apparently assumed that the owner of the car
was driving it. Yet, the officer had no basis for making such an assumption. (See Brief
of Appellant at 30-34). He did not know Tate or Biggs. (See e.g. R. 159:9, 13-14
(stating Sanders did not know Tate, and he verified Biggs' information after the stop)).
Also, Sanders assumed that the computer check reflecting lack of insurance supported a
crime, even though the law allowed for alternative forms of coverage and proof of
coverage. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-12a-301(2)(a) (requiring "owner's or operator's
security") (emphasis added); 31A-22-303(l)(a)(i), (ii)(B) (describing operator's security);
41-12a-303.2(2)(a)(i), (2)(b) (requiring the operator to display owner's or operator's
security upon the demand of an officer).
To the extent Officer Sanders did not know the law concerning the alternative
coverage, his ignorance of or disregard for the law cannot support reasonable suspicion
for the stop. See e.g. State v. Friesen. 1999 UT App 262, ffi|13-16, 988 P.2d 7 (where an
officer stopped defendant due to an incorrect assumption about the law, he lacked
reasonable suspicion for the stop); see also U.S. v. Twilley, 222 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir.
2000); (Brief of Appellant at 31-33).
9

As set forth in the opening Brief of Appellant, and as further set forth herein, the
trial court's ruling on the justification for the stop is in error. (See Brief of Appellant,
Argument B. 1.). This Court should reverse the ruling on the motion to suppress.
2. The State's Claim Regarding Preservation Is Misguided. Here the Defense
Articulated the Basis for Suppressing the Evidence in Papers Filed with the Court;
Thereafter, the State Was Required to Justify the Officer's Conduct. Any
Deficiency Here Is Due to the Fact that the State Failed to Meet Its Burden.
With respect to the scope of the detention, the state does not dispute that after
Officer Sanders initiated a stop and confirmed ownership of the car, he failed to limit the
detention to the circumstances that prompted it in the first place. (See Brief of Appellee,
Argument IL); see also State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994) (stating that a
detention "must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the
purpose of the stop" (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)). According to
the law, a level-two seizure or detention may continue beyond the scope of the
justification for the stop if officers had a reason, independent of the initial basis for the
stop, to expand or prolong it for an additional investigation. See State v. Chapman, 921
P.2d446, 453 (Utah 1996); see also Hansen, 2002 UT 125, Tf32; Lopez, 873 P.2dat 1135;
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968) ("good faith" on the part of the arresting officer is
not enough). Here, after Sanders confirmed ownership of the car, he did not identify any
reason to prolong or expand the scope of the detention. (SeeR. 159:4-14). Nevertheless,
Sanders further detained Tate and Biggs for a canine drug sniff and subsequent search.
(SeeR. 159:5-6; Brief of Appellant, Argument B.2.). That was impermissible. (See
Brief of Appellant, Argument B.2.).

10

On appeal, the state maintains that the issue of the continued detention was
"unpreserved" and is raised "for the first time on appeal." (Brief of Appellee at 18). That
is incorrect. In this case, Biggs filed a motion to suppress. (R. 42-69). The motion to
suppress raised the issue of the continued detention. (See R. 42-48). That was sufficient
for purposes of preservation.
Specifically, Rule 12 states that a defendant must present a motion to suppress as
follows:
A motion to suppress evidence shall:
(d)(1) describe the evidence sought to be suppressed;
(d)(2) set forth the standing of the movant to make the application; and
(d)(3) specify sufficient legal and factual grounds for the motion to give the
opposing party reasonable notice of the issues and to enable the court to determine
what proceedings are appropriate to address them.
If an evidentiary hearing is requested, no written response to the motion by the
non-moving party is required, unless the court orders otherwise. At the conclusion
of the evidentiary hearing, the court may provide a reasonable time for all parties
to respond to the issues of fact and law raised in the motion and at the hearing.
Utah R. Crim. P. 12(d) (2006). Biggs1 motion complied with the rule and gave notice that
she was challenging Sanders' initial and continued detention. (See R. 42-48; Brief of
Appellant at 3-4, 18-19, 34-35).
Here, Biggs identified the facts and set forth the evidence sought to be suppressed
in the trial court: she explained that Sanders ran a pre-detention computer check on the
car and the check reflected no insurance; the officer stopped the car, made contact with
the occupants, and confirmed ownership; Sanders then further detained the occupants for
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a canine drug sniff. (R. 42-43). The dog indicated on the exterior and the interior of the
car, and the officer discovered controlled substances. Sanders then arrested the occupants
and ran warrants checks. (R. 43-44; see also R. 159:6, 10-13).
The motion specified that Sanders failed to address the insurance issue with the
occupants of the car, even though he purportedly stopped the car for that reason. (See R.
43). Sanders did not otherwise "engag[e] in conduct that would dispel or confirm his
suspicions" about the insurance issue. (R. 43); see also Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a303.2(2)(a).
Biggs also specified the legal grounds for the motion, thereby giving notice of the
issues and enabling the court to determine what proceedings may be necessary. See Utah
R. Crim. P. 12(d)(3). She identified the standard for level-two detentions. (R. 44-45).
She argued that "[t]he length and scope of the detention must be 'strictly tied to and
justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." (R. 44-45 (cite
omitted)). Biggs cited to the law bearing on extended detentions and the law concerning
detentions exceeding the scope, as set forth in State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994),
State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991), and State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446 (Utah
1996). (R.45).
Biggs argued that a traffic stop must be "justified at the outset" (R. 45), and
limited in scope. (R. 45, 47). She argued that in this case, the stop was neither. (R. 47).
Biggs maintained that after Officer Sanders confirmed that the vehicle was not stolen, he
pursued a separate, unrelated line of investigation, leading to the canine drug sniff and
warrants checks. (See R. 47). Under the circumstances, the officer exceeded the original
10

basis for the stop, and the continued detention was unlawful. (See R. 47-48; see also
Brief of Appellant at 34-36).
The defense requested that the court suppress all evidence obtained during the
search and seizure of the car (R. 47-48), and the defense reserved the right to address any
additional facts and issues raised in the matter. (See R. 48).
As the moving party, Biggs made a preliminary showing sufficient to raise a
question as to the legality of the initial and continued detention. She demonstrated that
the officer engaged in conduct without a warrant, and she specified that the warrantless
conduct was unreasonable at inception and at the point where the officer failed to limit
the matter to the insurance issue. (R. 42-48). Biggs also attached a copy of Sanders1
sworn testimony to support the facts. (R. 49-69); see U.S. v. Marquez, 367 F.Supp.2d
600, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating that to be sufficient, the defendant's motion must
include the testimony of "someone alleging personal knowledge of the relevant fact, and
that fact must put the issue of the legality of the warrantless stop into contention"). The
written motion adequately raised the issue in the trial court. See Utah R. Crim. P. 12(d).
Under the law, once a defendant has made a preliminary showing in a motion to
suppress, the burden then shifts to the government to prove that warrantless conduct was
constitutional. (See Brief of Appellant at 18-19, 35 (citing State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d
408, 411 (Utah 1984))).
Generally, M[t]he proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing
that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or
seizure." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 132 n. 1, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387
(1978) (citations omitted). However, "if a defendant produces evidence that he
was arrested or subjected to a search without a warrant, the burden shifts to the
13

government to justify the warrantless arrest or search." United States v. de la
Fuente, 548 F.2d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1977); see United States v. Carhee, 27 F.3d
1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1994) ("As to the warrantless encounter, [defendant] bears
the burden of proving whether and when the Fourth Amendment was implicated....
The government then bears the burden of proving that its warrantless actions were
justified ....") (footnotes omitted); 6 Wayne LaFave, Search and Seizure: A
Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 11.2(b) (4th ed. 2004)("if the search or
seizure was pursuant to a warrant, the defendant has the burden of proof; but if the
police acted without a warrant the burden of proof is on the prosecution").
U.S. v. Jones. 374 F.Supp.2d 143, 147 (D.D.C. 2005); see also United States v. Johnson,
936 F.2d 1082, 1084 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that "[t]he government bears the burden of
justifying a warrantless search") (per curiam); U.S. v. Herrera, 444 F.3d 1238, 1242 (10th
Cir. 2006) (stating that the "Government fbears the ... burden of demonstrating the
reasonableness of a warrantless seizure1" (cite omitted; ellipsis in original)); Christensen,
676 P.2d at 411, 412 (mling that "[s]ince the officers had no warrant, it was the burden of
the State to show that the search was lawful"; also since the state presented no evidence
regarding the matter, the discovered container would be suppressed); U.S. v. Carhee, 27
F.3d 1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that the government bears the burden of
proving that its warrantless actions were justified); U.S. v. Roch, 5 F.3d 894, 897 (5th
Cir. 1993); (Brief of Appellant at 18-19, 35).
Here, it was incumbent upon the state to establish that the officer's conduct was
justified. The prosecutor argued in the suppression hearing that the detention was lawful
at inception due to an insurance violation. (See R. 158). Also, she called Ken Stuart and
Officer Sanders to testify about the insurance database. (R. 158).
The prosecutor did not seek to present any additional information on the legality
of the continued detention. (See e.g. R. 158:17-22). Thus, based on the argument that
14

the prosecutor presented at the hearing, the defense responded. (See R. 158:22-30; see
also 48 (stating that the defense would reserve the right to present a supplemental
motion)); see also Utah R. Crim. P. 12(d)(3) (stating that the court may provide the
parties with the opportunity to address matters raised in the motion and at the hearing);
People v. Williams, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 275, 973 P.2d 52, 60, 64-65 (Cal. 1999) (stating that
defendants are not required to guess at what justifications the prosecution will argue, but
may wait for the prosecution to present the justification; also, defendants are not required
in the hearing to specify the inadequacy of the prosecution's justifications or to help the
prosecution: M[d]efendants need only be specific enough to give the prosecution and the
court reasonable notice").
The trial court then ruled. It addressed the initial basis for the stop as argued by
the prosecutor in the hearing. (R. 158:34-37). In addition, it executed the findings and
conclusions prepared by the prosecutor. (R. 96-99). The state-prepared conclusions
reflect that (1) Sanders was justified at inception in stopping the vehicle, and (2) the
"Defendant's Motion to Suppress" should be denied. (R. 99 at lffil-2; 94). Here, the trial
court ruled on the motion to suppress in its entirety. (Id.) Its ruling is subject to review.
Biggs properly challenged the continued detention here. (R. 42-69). The issue is
preserved. The state failed to present evidence to justify the continued detention. (See R.
158:17-21; 159:5-6). Thus, the search may not be upheld. See Christensen, 676 P.2d at
411, 412 (ruling that "[s]ince the officers had no warrant, it was the burden of the State to
show that the search was lawful"; also since the state presented no evidence regarding the
matter, the discovered container would be suppressed). This Court may reverse the trial
1<5

court's ruling on the motion to suppress.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in the Brief of Appellant and herein, Biggs respectfully
requests that this Court reverse the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress.
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